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CONSIDERATION IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW OF CONTRACTS
(A Historical Summary)
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS*
What is the theory of consideration in contract law under the
Anglo-American legal system?
In order properly to answer this question it will be helpful to
consider, first, contract law in England prior to the sixteenth
century, and, second, contract law in England and the United
States since the sixteenth century.
I
CONTRACT LAW IN ENGLAND PRIOR TO SIXTEENTH CENTURY
Prior to the sixteenth century there was no contract law in
England except as it was associated with the action of covenant,
with the action of debt, and with the procedure in equity (and
the law merchant courts).
Covenant
Covenant was available before the year 1201, and it has sur-
vived up to the present time, except as it has been supplanted
by debt and assumpsit. In the beginning it is said to have been
an action for the breach of every kind of promise, oral or writ-
ten, both real and personal; and if it had continued as it began,
it might today cover the entire field of contract law. But by the
* Professor of Law, Indiana University. This article is revised and
reprinted from the Pennsylvania Law Review with the permission of the
editors of that periodical.
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close of the reign of Edward I (1307) it had become the law
that, in order to be valid, a covenant must be in writing and
under the seal of the covenantor. Since that time, consequently,
the action of covenant has only lain to recover damages for
breach of a sealed promise to do some particular act.1
In covenant no consideration was necessary to give a cause of
action. All that was required, even after the reign of Edward I,
was writing, sealing and delivery. (In the United States, in
more modern times, acceptance and signing are also sometimes
required.) Yet unlike debt and assumpsit, as we shall soon see,
covenant was from the first a remedy for breach of promise;
and if it had not been for the limitation on its scope imposed
by the law of evidence, that writing-which at that time meant
a writing under seal-should be the only admissible proof, it
would have become co-extensive in scope with the law of agree-
ment. Then we should have had, not only certain contracts-
i. e., covenants-requiring no consideration, but we should have
had no contracts requiring consideration. When we realize that
it was only because of what might be called a historical accident
that this threatened consummation did not result, we begin to
realize how uncertain, to say the least, is the foundation for
the requirement of consideration in Anglo-American contract
law. But, since covenant was restricted to a class of agree-
ments which every day became narrower and narrower, it was
finally largely supplanted by another action (assumpsit) which
more nearly conformed to the demands of society.2
Debt
Debt is thought of as a common law action for the recovery
of money or chattels, due and made certain in amount by con-
tract, by custom, or by record;3 it is an action even older than
covenant.4 Later it was broken up into debt for money and
detinue for other chattels, but at first no such distinction was
I III Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 114-126; 23 Publications of
the Selden Society, 43, 47.
2 Salmond, History of Contract, 3 Select Anglo-American Essays 325.
Equity also was an accomplice before the fact of the demise of covenant
by its refusal to grant specific performance thereof, although it did not
always strictly adhere to its refusal. Jefferys v. Jefferys, Craig & Phil-
lips 139; Ames' Cases in Equity, 261, 431-435.
3 III Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 127.
4 Stokes v. Trent, A. D. 1200, Selden Soc. Pub., Vol. 1, Case 38.
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made. In its early history debt was available in two classes of
cases, surety cases and "delivery-promise" -cases.5
In the original surety cases the promisee (pursuer) gave up
his right to take revenge on the pursued at the request of the
surety promisors. The surety took the place of the earlier host-
age, and became personally liable for the debt, or composition,
substituted for revenge. By the twelfth century the engagement
of the surety had largely lost its early formal character, and yet
it had not as yet taken on the requirements of writing and seal.
It constituted a simple debt, and was enforced by the action of
debt.6
In these early surety cases, the Anglo-Saxons did not look for
detriment to the promisee, but it existed and was the ground
for the liability of the surety, unless such cases are to be ex-
plained on the ground of benefit to the one for whom the surety
made his promise. Hence there was a possibility that detriment
to the promisee might in debt have been required for the en-
forcement of a promise, and therefore have developed into con-
sideration. But this did not occur, because, in the reign of
Edward III, the surety contract was merged into the covenant,
or contract under seal, and perhaps to some extent into the "de-
livery-promise" or "real" contract.7 Hence detriment to the
promisee, as consideration, did not become a requirement for
contracts through the action of debt. This result was left for
another action (special assumpsit), which was developed later.
In the "delivery-promise" cases different conceptions entered.
The exchange was a typical transaction of this sort. In the
exchange, if one man delivered chattels for other chattels or
money, which another man agreed to return therefor, but the
latter failed to perform, the latter owed to the former the chat-
tels or money which he had agreed to return, and debt would lie
to recover the same. This law of exchange was extended to
bargain and sale, to contracts of hiring, to obligations of record
and of statute, and to promises under seal, on the theory in the
last case that the sealed promise was a grant which took effect
by its form only. In all cases, except the last three named,
there was a possibility of finding either detriment to the prom-
5 Henry, Consideration in Contracts, 26 Yale L. Jour. 679-681.
6 11 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 7-8.
7 Henry, Consideration in Contracts, 26 Yale L. Jour. 688; II Street,
Foundations of Legal Liability, 45-47.
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isee in the thing surrendered for the promise, or benefit to the
promisor in the thing received therefor. If the courts had
adopted the first view, we again might have had introduced
early into English law the idea of detriment to the promisee as
consideration for a promise. But the courts, as the ground for
recovery, did not adopt this view, but took the view of benefit
to the promisor, as found in the quid pro quo doctrine. Accord-
ing to this doctrine, something had to be given or done on one
side for something to be given or done on the other side, so
that the defendant always received something (a benefit) from
the plaintiff, in return for which he owed something to the
plaintiff.8
Whether or not this requirement of quid pro quo might have
come to be called consideration and perhaps might have become
the sole consideration required by the common law for contracts,
had the action of debt grown with the growth of the law of
contracts, there is no means of knowing, because the action of
debt did not have this history. It placed the law of contracts
in a worse straight-jacket than did the action of covenant, and
it finally had to go. For one thing, because of the common law
notion of quid pro quo, promises as such were not enforceable.
In addition, the method of trial in actions of debt was by wager
of law (a system of proof by oath with or without the support-
ing oath of compurgators). These two burdens were too much
for debt, and it went down, so that it could not be revived even
by the abolition of wager of law in England in 1833.9 The
action of debt may now be regarded as practically obsolete both
in England and in the United States. The obligations formerly
enforced as contracts by means of the action of debt are now
for the most part enforced by general assumpsit in its varied
forms, as quasi contracts. The notions of quid pro quo and of
benefit to the promisor may have survived to some extent in
modern contract law, but, if so, it is in connection with the
actions of assumpsit, and any further consideration of such
notions will be postponed until such actions are considered.
Equity
Equity, at one period in English history, assumed jurisdiction
over contracts in a way different from its modern jurisdiction.
8 Henry, Consideration in Contracts, 26 Yale L. Jour. 683; III Street,
Foundations of Legal Liability, 127-143; Salmond, History of Contract, 3
Select Anglo-American Essays, 323.
9 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 42, s. 13.
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How extensive this ancient jurisdiction was it is impossible to
say, although there is some evidence that it was at one time very
extensive. Lord Mansfield apparently obtained from this source,
or from a common source, his views in regard to moral con-
sideration and motive as consideration. There is definite proof
that equity introduced some of its theories of consideration into
the Anglo-American law of conveyancing. The theories of con-
sideration, which were adopted by the chancellors, former
ecclesiastics, who developed the law of equity, were taken from
the canon, or ecclesiastical, law. These theories were not exactly
like the theories of consideration (causa) which obtained in the
Roman law, but they were similar to them and developed from
them. In conveyancing, equity required either what was called
a valuable consideration for a bargain and sale, or what was
called a good consideration for covenants to stand seized. For
simple promises equity seems to have required other kinds of
cascL.
The dissatisfaction with the law of covenant and with the law
of debt was so great, that in the course of time the chancellors
might have succeeded in introducing into English law most of
the principles of the Roman law of contracts, had it not been
for one thing; and that was the development of the action of
assumpsit, to which we have already referred in connection with
covenant and debt. The action of assumpsit had the same effect
upon the development of the law of consideration in equity that
it had upon the development of the law of consideration in
covenant and debt, but for very different reasons. It is true
that the requirements of equity did not become obsolete, at least
so far as concerns the doctrine of valuable consideration and
the notion that an enforceable promise must have some cause
for it (a notion which has had some influence both in general
assumpsit and in special assumpsit) ; but they did not continue
their special and independent development, because the equity
courts did not continue their special and independent develop-
ment. As a result, whatever influence equity might otherwise
have had upon the law of contracts was checked, and henceforth
whatever development there was in the law of contracts occurred
in the common law courts.' 0
10 Salmond, History of Contract, 3 Select Anglo-American Essays, 329-
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Law Merchant
Very little is known as to whether or not the law merchant
courts developed any different law of consideration than was
developed in the local Anglo-Saxon courts. Most of the cases
found seem to show no difference' 0 and it seems to be the opin-
ion that any contribution of the merchants is found in the law
of debt, as a joint product of both kinds of courts ;lob but there
are cases in the merchants courts where an executory promise
was apparently thought as sufficient consideration as it would be
in modern law. 0e
II
CONTRACT LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY
With the sixteenth century the law of contracts began an
independent history. For the reasons already set forth, the
law of contracts prior to that time had been becoming more and
more unsatisfactory, except for the ameliorations which equity
afforded. At about this time the action of trespass on the case
and the other actions on the case were having a marvelous devel-
opment, both because they, like trespass, were tried by a jury
instead of by wager of law, and because thereby the common
law courts were enabled to keep litigants out of the chancery
court. One of these actions on the case was special assumpsit,
generally regarded as an action on the case in the nature of
deceit. This action soon lent itself to the enforcement of
promises as such, oral as well as written; and thereby afforded
the common law courts a substitute for the dying action of debt
and the inadequate action of covenant on the one hand, and for
the threatening jurisdiction of equity on the other. Special
assumpsit was allowed in the sixteenth century in cases of uni-
lateral agreements, 1' and in the seventeenth century in cases of
1a 23 Publications of the Selden Society, 23, 25, 39, 47, 50, 51, 64, 68,
75-103.
10b Henry, Contracts in the Local Courts of Medieval England, 9.
1oc 23 Publications of the Selden Society, 43, 46, 60.
11 Keilw. 77, pl. 25; 69, pl. 2; 3 Leon. 88.
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bilateral agreements 12 (though these terms were not used until
they were coined and given currency by Judge Dillon and Dean
Langdell). Another one of the actions on the case was general
assumpsit, generally regarded as an action on the case in the
nature of debt. General assumpsit supplanted debt. It was
first allowed in the sixteenth century for recovery upon an
express promise to pay a simple precedent debt,13 but it was
allowed in the early seventeenth century in the ease of an im-
plied promise,14 which meant that one could sue in general
assumpsit wherever there was a simple debt.
What, if any, was the law as to consideration both in general
assumpsit and in special assumpsit?
General Assumpsit
The consideration, if any, in general assumpsit was precedent
debt. If this meant anything before the time when general
assumpsit was allowed without an express promise, it meant
nothing thereafter, except that general assumpsit was concur-
rent with debt. Of course, a promise was made in the creation
of the debt, and in the true debt cases it was made for what the
old law called the consideration of quid pro quo. But this was
not the consideration for the assumpsit, since it was a new lia-
bility predicated upon the promise implied by law in addition
to the liability involved in the creation of the debt. The action
of general assumpsit was extended until it was allowed on in-
ferred contracts and on contracts wholly performed except for
the payment of money, because in all these cases there was a
debt, and the real basis for the plaintiff's recovery was the debt
and not the alleged promise.15 Both the promise and the con-
sideration were fictitious. The form was seized upon to allow
recovery in certain cases where it was desired not to use the
action of debt.' 6 If precedent debt had been a real considera-
tion and if recovery in general assumpsit had really been
upon the promise, express or implied, precedent debt should
have been sufficient consideration at present; but in Eng-
land at any rate it has been decided that precedent debt is no
sufficient consideration for any promise other than that which
'2 Strangeborough and Warner's Case, 4 Leon. 3.
13 Edwards v. Burre, Dal. 104, pl. 45.
14 Slade's Case, 4 Coke 92b.
15 3 Stand. Encyc. of Pro. 166.
16 McKelvey, Common Law Pleading, 26.
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the law would imply,17 and past consideration, with two excep-
tions, has been everywhere repudiated.
The exceptions to which reference has been made include
cases of bills and notes (law merchant law) and those cases
where the Roman theory of consideration unmodified was, under
the guise of moral consideration,1 8 introduced into English law
in precedent debt cases. 19 These cases of moral consideration
were promises to pay debts barred by a discharge in bank-
ruptcy,20 promises by a discharged surety,21 promises by a
former infant,22 promises by a widow to pay an indebtedness
which she incurred when incapacitated to contract,23 promises
to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations,24 and prom-
ises to rectify a previous mistake or illegality. 25 This was done
through the influence of Lord Mansfield, who disliked the com-
mon law, and approved of the civil law, doctrine of considera-
tion, although he apparently introduced his theory of considera-
tion only into cases of general assumpsit, where precedent debt
was called the consideration, and not into cases of special
assumpsit, where, as we shall see, detriment to the promisee
was generally held to be the consideration; but in introducing
this innovation into the law of general assumpsit he made the
17 Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R. 350. See also, Salmon v. Brown, 6 Blackf.
347, and Wiggins v. Keizer, 6 Ind. 201.
18 Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunton 36.
19 Account stated may be another exception: Williston, Contracts, Sec.
1862.
20 Trueman v. Fenton, Cowper 544; Zavelo v. Reeves et al., 227 U. S.
625; Earle v. Oliver, 2 Exch. 71; Herrington v. Davitt et al., 220 N. Y.
162; Willis et al. v. Cushman et al., 115 Ind. 100.
21 Rindge v. Kimball, 124 Mass. 209; Hurlburt v. Bradley et al., 94
Conn. 495; Matchett v. Winona etc. Assn., 185 Ind. 128.
22Edmond's Case, 3 Leon. 164; Williams v. Moor, 11 M. & W. 256;
Merriam v. Wilkins, 6 N. H. 432; Edgerly v. Shaw, 25 N. H. 514; Johnson
v. Rockwell, 12 Ind. 76.
23 Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 36. Maher v. Martin, 43 Ind. 314; Put-
nam et al. v. Tennyson, 50 Ind. 456; Austin v. Davis et al., 128 Ind. 472,
contra.
24 Little v. Blunt, 9 Pick. 488; Clark v. Jones, 233 Mass. 591; Carshore
v. Huyck, 6 Barb. 583; Trask v. Weeks, 81 Me. 325; Barber v. Heath, 74
N. H. 270; Niblackv . Goodman, 67 Ind. 174.
2 5 Barnes v. Hedley, 2 Taunt. 184; Early v. Mahon, 19 Johns. 147;
Brewster v. Banta, 66 N. J. L. 367; Muir v. Kane, 55 Wash. 131.
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consideration the moral obligation rather than the precedent
debt.26
Recovery is still allowed in the cases above enumerated. How-
ever, now it is frequently said that recovery is on the original
obligation, and that the new promise amounts only to a waiver
of a defense which the party could have theretofore interposed. 27
This new explanation is not sound in the case of a promise to
rectify a mistake, or illegality, or in the case of a promise of a
married woman ;28 and the validity of the new explanation given
for the decisions is beginning to be questioned in all cases.29 If
the suit is on the original obligation, why is the extent of the
liability governed by the new promise? And why is it necessary
to have a new promise rather than a mere admission? Again,
under our present law of consideration, how can there be a
waiver of a defense unless such waiver is itself supported by a
consideration, or creates an estoppel? The new explanation
may have to be abandoned. In that event what will be the next
explanation? The courts will not want to overrule their earlier
decisions and deny recovery. If they do not, and the waiver
theory is not tenable, it would seem that the courts will either
have to go back to the old theory of precedent debt as considera-
tion, or to the theory of moral obligation (causq) as considera-
tion,30 or that they will have to abandon the requirement of
26 It should be noted that certain problems in cases of promises to pay
debts barred by the statute of limitations, discharges in bankruptcy, etc.,
can be explained only by reference to general assumpsit with its require-
ment of precedent debt. This explanation is rarely given but it is im-
portant to remember it. Williston, Contracts, Secs. 160, 201.
2 7Dusenbury v. Hoyt, 53 N. Y. 521; Carshore v. Huyck, 6 Barb. 583;
Trask v. Weeks et al., 81 Me. 325; Way v. Sperry, 16 Cush. 238; Ilsley v.
Jewett, 3 Metc. 439; State Trust Co. v. Sheldon, 68 Vt. 259; Gillingham
v. Brown, 178 Mass. 417.
28 Early v. Mahon, 19 Johns. 147; Brewster v. Banta, 66 N. J. L. 367;
Lee v. Muggeridge et al., 5 Taunt. 36; Williston, Contracts, Sec. 150.
29 29 Yale L. Jour. 94; Williston, Contracts, Secs. 148-166; Heller v.
Crawford, 30 Ind. 279.
30 Merriam et al. v. Wilkins et al., 6 N. H. 432; Edgerly v. Shaw, 25
N. H. 514; Clark v. Jones, 233 Mass. 591; Barber v. Heath, 74 N. H. 270;
Zavelo v. Reeves et al., 227 U. S. 625; Earle v. Oliver, 2 Exch. 71. In some
United States jurisdictions the doctrine of moral obligation as considera-
tion is still well recognized. Williston, Contracts, Secs. 149-150. Willis et
al. v. Cushman, 115 Ind. 100 ( Bankruptcy). But of. Wells v. Ross et al.,
77 Ind. 1.
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consideration in such cases. If the last course were taken, it
would naturally raise the question, why consideration should be
required in any cases. Of course, if both the law of considera-
tion and the law of agreement, as developed in connection with
the action of special assumpsit, were thrown overboard, and
promises were enforced simply as promises, there would be no
difficulty in enforcing such promises as are referred to herein.
Is it possible then to say that the different kinds of considera-
tion developed in connection with the action of general assumpsit
are now obsolete, and we need pay no further attention to them?
It is possible to explain the cases where general assumpsit will
lie on inferred contracts and on contracts wholly performed
except for the payment of money on the ground that there is
consideration in the original contract and that general assump-
sit is simply an additional remedy. It is possible to explain
most other problems in general assumpsit as quasi contracts,
where no law of consideration is involved.31 But so long as the
problems referred to in the preceding paragraph remain and so
long as the requirement of consideration remains in our law,
is it possible to say that precedent debt and moral obligation are
no longer consideration in Anglo-American law? It is sub-
mitted that no one knows.8 2
SpeciaZ Assumpsit
Special assumpsit was at first regarded as a tort action, and
the root of liability therefor was damage done by deceitful
artifice. This damage was a detriment to the promisee, but it
followed the promise (or assumpsit); it was not given in ex-
change for the promise. In the beginning of the history of this
action the courts did not think of enforcing promises. If, in any
case, the action appeared to be one merely for breach of promise,
they refused to allow the action to be maintained,33 and remitted
the plaintiff to his action of covenant or to no action at all. Yet,
little by little, the courts retreated from their first position, until
31 This, of course, eliminates benefit to promisor as consideration so
far as the action of general assumpsit is concerned, with the exceptions
named.
32 It should be noted that if there is contract liability in general as-
sumpsit, the doctrine of consideration is not the only anomaly therein.
The general principles of agreement are lacking.
33 Walton v. Brinth, Y. B., 2 Hen. IV 3, p1. 9.
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at last they began to allow special assumpsit for breach of
promises. At first they allowed it when a person undertook to
do something and was guilty of malfeasance, and then when he
was guilty of misfeasance, and finally when he was guilty of
non-feasance merely. By going this far they changed the action
of special assumpsit from a tort action into a contract action, and
they at times apparently enforced promises simply because they
were promises.34 If this practice had continued, Anglo-Ameri-
can law would have reached the point finally reached by the
Roman law and the point which Anglo-American law would
have reached through the route of covenant if it had been
released from the handicap of the seal; but this practice did not
continue. Something happened to make the courts think that, if
they were to enforce promises, those promises must be embodied
in a contract and that contract must possess a consideration. If
the courts had continued the development of special assumpsit
as they began it, or if they had been influenced by the law of
covenant, they would not have worried about finding considera-
tion. But, evidently, other influences prevailed. Perhaps the
influential factor was the notion of quid pro quo in the law of
debt. Perhaps it was the equity notions of consideration. At
any rate the courts took the position, after they came to regard
special assumpsit as a contract action, that one of its prerequi-
sites was that some consideration should be given for a promise.
Injury following a failure to keep a promise was not enough.
For injurious reliance there was substituted something in the
nature of a bargain. Hence, in special assumpsit, the doctrine
became established that some price as consideration was neces-
sary for the enforceability of a promise.5
But what theory of consideration did the courts adopt for
bargain cases? What did they require to be given for the
promise? Did they seize hold of the notion of detriment to the
promisee, which had always been required in the tort action of
special assumpsit and with which they were familiar, and re-
quire this to be given for the promise? Or did they seize hold
of the notion of benefit as it existed in debt? Or did they adopt
the theory that it might be either detriment to the promisee or
benefit to the promisor? Or did they adopt the theory that it
34 Hurford v. Pile, Cro. Jac. 483.
35 Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 4-7, 53; "Assumpsit," 3
Stand. Encyc. of Pro. 170-175, 192.
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must be both detriment to the promisee and benefit to the prom-
isor? Or did they adopt the equitable theory of consideration?
Or did they adopt a combined theory of some sort? It will be
noticed that there are three conceptions running through this
list of questions: (1) detriment to the promisee, (2) benefit to
the promisor, and (3) whether it is one or the other or both, it
is something given in exchange for a promise. It will conduce to
clearness to consider these ideas separately.
Benefit to the Promisor
Was benefit to the promisor in any form adopted by the courts
as sufficient consideration for a promise? So far as I know, no
one contends that the courts of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, or the courts of the subsequent centuries, adopted as
the theory of consideration in special assumpsit either the theory
that only benefit to the promisor could be sufficient consideration,
or the theory that there would have to be both benefit to the
promisor and detriment to the promisee. If the benefit theory
has been adopted at all, it has been in the form that considera-
tion could be either detriment to the promisee or benefit to the
promisor.
If the courts, at the time when they made over the action of
special assumpsit into a contract action from a tort action and
began to require consideration, adopted the theory that benefit
to the promisor, as well as detriment to the promisee, could be a
consideration for a promise, they found this part of their theory,
not in anything peculiar to the action of special assumpsit, but
in something extraneous to it. The roots of special assumpsit
are found in the tort law of deceit (or perhaps trespass). The
origin of the requirement of detriment to the promisee may be
found in this territory, but not any such requirement as benefit
to the promisor. If the law of contracts, as it was found in
debt, had continued in its two-fold application to surety cases
and to "delivery-promise" cases, it is easy to conceive how such
a two-headed consideration as we are discussing might have
resulted;36 but we know that no such development occurred.
Did the courts go outside of special assumpsit and import from
this or another source the notion of benefit to the promisor as
consideration? Apparently they imported from some source the
notion that consideration, whatever it was, must be the induce-
36 Henry, Consideration in Contracts, 26 Yale L. Jour. 694-698.
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ment for, or given in exchange for, the promise. Perhaps they
also imported this other notion of benefit.
How stands the law on this point? The books are full of
statements that consideration may be either benefit to the prom-
isor or detriment to the promisee. But unless there are cases
where benefit to the promisor alone has been held sufficient con-
sideration, these statements will have to be put down as mere
dicta, probably erroneous dicta, and explicable on the ground of
the confusion of special assumpsit with general assumpsit in the
minds of the judges in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
and because of the uncertainty caused by removing the law of
consideration from the old foundations of debt and equity to the
new foundation of special assumpsit (and general assumpsit).
Are there any such cases? Shadwell v. ShadwelI37 is sometimes
referred to as such a case, and if there are any such cases, they
are of its type. In this case an uncle promised to pay a certain
sum of money for a certain time to his nephew if he would marry
a certain young lady. They were already engaged to be married,
and later the nephew married the young lady. The court held
the uncle's estate liable on his promise, and found consideration
both in the loss which the nephew sustained and in the benefit
which the uncle derived. 3 8 If there was detriment to the prom-
isee, it was not necessary to find also benefit to the promisor.
The process by which the court found detriment to the promisee
was somewhat far-fetched, but no more so than that by which it
found benefit to the promisor. As a matter of fact, if the
assumptions of the court were true, it probably found detriment
to the promisee but not benefit to the promisor, and this and
subsequent cases which have followed it should be thus inter-
37 30 L. J. Rep. C. P. 145. See also the early case of Reynolds v. Pin-
howe, Cro. Eliz. 429, which of course has been overruled so far as benefit
is concerned.
38 "I am aware that a man's marriage with a woman of his choice is
in one sense a boon, and in that sense the reverse of loss; yet, as between
the plaintiff and the party promising an income to support the marriage,
it may be a loss. The plaintiff may have made the most material changes
in his position, and have induced the object of his affections to do the
same, and have incurred pecuniary liabilities resulting in embarrassments,
which would be in every sense a loss if the income which had been prom-
ised should be withheld." "The marriage primarily affects the parties
thereto; but in the second degree it may be an object of interest with a
near relative, and in that sense a benefit to him."
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preted.3 9 But probably both the fact of benefit and the fact of
detriment were pure assumptions, and if the case is authority
for anything, it is authority for some other theory of considera-
tion than that of detriment to the promisee or benefit to the
promisor. 40 Most American cases deny recovery in such cases
as that of ShadweUi v. Shadwell, on the ground that there is no
consideration of any sort.41
However, either because of statutory enactment or because the
courts have themselves adopted the theory, though we cannot
help wondering what reasons moved both legislatures and courts,
some modern American courts have evidently applied the theory
that benefit to the promisor may be sufficient consideration,42
and some text-writers have taken the same position.43
This is the situation so far as there is authority in support of
the proposition that benefit to the promisor is a sufficient alterna-
tive requirement to the requirement of detriment to the prom-
isee. Is there any authority against this proposition?
Before answering this question it will be well, if possible, to
get a definition of the term "benefit to the promisor."' Benefit
has been defined as the acquirement by the promisor of a legal
right to which he would not otherwise have been entitled. 44 But
this definition is given by those courts which define detriment as
forbearance by the promisee of some legal right which he other-
wise would have been entitled to exercise. Other authorities do
not agree upon this definition of detriment. Hence they might
not agree upon this definition of benefit. Mr. Williston contends
that "benefit correspondingly must mean the receiving as the
exchange for his promise of something which the promisor was
not previously entitled to receive," following the analogy of his
39 Scotson v. Pegg, 6 Hurl & N. 295; Abbott v. Doane, 163 Mass. 433;
DeCicco v. Schweizer et al., 221 N. Y. 431.
40 Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 327-8, 340.
41 Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 328.
42 Saunders v. Carter, 91 Ga. 450; Ryon v. Trimble, 22 Ky. Law Rep.
1444; Union Bank v. Sullivan, 214 N. Y. 332. The last case committed
the error of holding that a promisor can give himself consideration for his
own promise. See Williston's criticism, Williston, Contracts, Sec. 102a.
See also Trackwell v. Irwin, 66 Ind. App. 5 and Harbert v. Dumont, 3
Ind. 346.
43 Morgan, 1 Minn. L. Rev. 383; Williston, Contracts, See. 131a; Cor-
bin, 27 Yale L. Jour. 368.
44Harkness v. McKee-Brown Lbr. Co., 17 Okla. 624; Harp v. Hamil-
ton (Tex. Civ A.), 177 S. W. 565.
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF CONTRACTS
definition of detriment, which he would define as the giving or
the promise to give something to which a person has a legal
right. That is, with him, benefit means legal benefit, just as
detriment means legal detriment.45 Mr. Corbin, however, main-
tains that "it adds nothing to the definition to substitute for it
the term 'legal benefit.' "46 In the law of quasi contracts the
term "benefit" means actual pecuniary benefit. If this is the
notion of benefit to be adopted, why should we not prefer to
leave the entire matter of recovery for such conferred benefits
to the law of quasi contracts, and, if recovery is not there as yet
sufficiently broad, to develop the law of quasi contracts to meet
the situation, instead of trying to introduce the notion of benefit
into the law of consideration ?47 It is doubtful if at the present
time outside of quasi contracts there has been or can be formu-
lated a definition of "benefit to the promisor" which would be
generally accepted. This is probably in itself some evidence
against the theory of benefit as consideration.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when our modern
law of contracts was in the making and when lawyers were
familiar with the notion of benefit as consideration because of
the quid pro quo requirement of debt, there were no cases in
actions of assumpsit which held that benefit alone could be suffi-
cient consideration; but there were many cases which held that
detriment alone could be sufficient consideration.48 Since law-
yers at that time were familiar with the requirement of benefit,
they urged it upon the courts, but the courts said, "It is not ma-
terial whether the consideration be for the plaintiff's benefit;
for if it be any charge or trouble to the defendant, it sufficeth."149
45 Williston, Contracts, Sec. 102a.
46 27 Yale L. Jour. 370.
47 It would seem that the territory of recovery for conferred benefits
is sufficiently covered by the law of quasi contracts, so that there is no
need of extending the notion into the law of contracts. The mere fact
that the law will create an obligation without a contract is no argument
that it should also make the obligation a contract. The law imposes upon
a minor an obligation to pay for necessaries, but it would not be con-
tended that he should be liable on his express promise to pay therefor.
48 Webb's Case, 4 Leon. 110; Smith v. Smith, 3 Leon. 88; Fooly and
Preston's Case, 1 Leon. 297; Sir Anthony Sturlyn v. Albany, Cro. Eliz. 67;
Sands v. Trevilain, Cro. Car. 193; Wheatley v. Low, Cro. Jac. 668; Coggs
v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray. 920. See also Cates v. Seagraves, 56 Ind. App. 486.
49 Knight v. Rushworth, Cro. Eliz. 469.
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"Though the party promising hath no benefit by this, yet this is
a good consideration and the party liable to an action upon the
case." 50  Hence in assumpsit the law of consideration was not
placed upon the old foundation of debt but was placed upon a
new foundation found in tort law.
Of course the mere fact that detriment has been held to be
sufficient consideration and that there are no early cases holding
that benefit might be sufficient consideration, would not prove
that benefit could not be consideration. In order to prove this,
there must be cases holding that benefit is not sufficient con-
sideration. Are there any such cases? There have been many
such. Where the courts have held that there is no consideration
because there was no detriment to the promisee, though if they
had looked for it they might have found benefit to the promisor
in one or both of the senses above referred to, the courts have
repudiated the notion of benefit to the promisor as consideration
just as truly as though they had expressly so said.51 Where the
courts h ave held that there was consideration because of detri-
ment to the promisee, but have shown that if they had not found
detriment to the promisee they would have held that there was
no consideration, they also have repudiated the theory that con-
sideration might be benefit to the promisor.52 There have been
a great number of cases of both of these classes. Some of these
are cited in the notes below. Illustrations of the first class of
cases are found where a third person, because of some benefit
such performance would be to him, makes a promise to a person
already under legal obligation to perform a certain act or acts
for another. 53  There have been many decisions of this sort,54
50 Freeman v. Freeman, 2 Bulst. 269.
51 White v. Bluett, 23 L. J. (N. S.) Exch. 36; Stilk v. Myrick, 2 Camp.
370; Miles v. New Zealand, 32 Ch. Div. 266; Keith v. Miles, 39 Miss. 442;
Springstead et al. v. Nees et al., 125 App. Div. (N. Y.) 230. Note also
Foakes v. Beer, L. R. 9 A. C. 605, and other cases of discharge.
52 DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431; Haigh v. Brooks, 10 Adol. &
El. 309; Deveomon v. Shaw, 69 Md. 199; Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R.
5 Q. B. 449. Note also cases of forbearance to sue and forbearance to
complain.
53 Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 328.
54 Johnson's Adm'r v. Seller's Adm'r, 33 Ala 265; Havana Press Drill
Co. v. Ashurst, 148 Ill. 115; Schuler v. Myton, 48 Kan. 282; Putnam v.
Woodbury, 68 Me. 58; Sherwin v. Brigham, 39 Ohio St. 137; Gordon V.
Gordon, 56 N. H. 170; Wimer v. Overseers of Poor, 104 Pa. 317; Hanks
v. Barron, 95 Tenn. 275; 13 C. J. 356-357.
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and recent decisions show no tendency to depart from the old
rule.
One recent case of this sort was that of McDevitt v. Stokes.55
In this case M was under contract with X to drive a certain mare
in the Kentucky Futurity. S was the owner of other horses
related to this mare, whose value would be increased to the
extent of $25,000 if this mare won the race. By the mare's win-
ning the race he also would be entitled to a prize of $300 as the
owner of her dam. Because of these considerations S offered
to pay M $1,000 if he won the race, and M did. According to
some American cases (though not Kentucky), there was detri-
ment to the promisee here, and it would seem there was benefit
to the promisor according to either of the usual court's defini-
tions of benefit. The court, however, held that there was no
consideration and that S was not liable to M, thereby repudiat-
ing the theory of benefit to the promisor. It is true the court
tried to distinguish between actual benefit and legal benefit and
said that there was no legal benefit, but, when before the con-
tract S had no legal right against M, the writer is unable to see
how he could not acquire a legal right by this contract. Hence
there was legal benefit, as well as actual benefit, in this case, but
the court held it not sufficient consideration, and the case must
therefore be held to be direct authority against benefit as con-
sideration.
Another illustration of the first class of cases is found in such
recent cases as Masline v. New York, etc., R. Co., 56 and Soule V.
Bon Ami Co. 57 In the Masline case the defendant railway com-
pany offered to pay the plaintiff 5 per cent. of the gross receipts
to be derived from the use of information of value which the
plaintiff said he possessed but whose nature was not yet dis-
closed. Plaintiff, by way of acceptance of defendant's offer,
gave the following information: "The selling of advertising
space and the displaying of advertisements by defendant on its
railway stations, depots, rights of way, cars and fences." The
question in the case was whether this was sufficient considera-
tion for defendant's promise. The court held that it was not,
because the plaintiff did not give up anything to which he had
a legal right, that is, there was no legal detriment, "because the
55 174 Ky. 515.
G6 95 Conn. 702.
57 195 N. Y. S. 574.
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idea was not new nor exclusively within the plaintiff's knowl-
edge, but was perfectly obvious and well known to all men, and
it could have no market value so as to form the consideration
for a contract." Yet the defendant, if he did not in fact have
in mind the information given, received actual benefit, if not
legal benefit. Hence the court held that benefit alone could not
be sufficient consideration.
A majority of text-writers have taken the position, not only
for themselves but as the position of the courts, that benefit to
the promisor is not sufficient consideration for a promise. 58
What, then, is the law as to whether or not benefit to the
promisor may be consideration for his promise? Historically
there seems to be no argument for it. The decisions against it
are overwhelming in number as compared with those in its sup-
port. The term has not even been acceptably defined. Yet the
books are full of dicta to the effect that it may amount to con-
sideration. Judges seem never to be able to find any benefit
sufficient to be called consideration, but they always seem to
hold out the hope that sometime they may be able to do so. Some
states have given these dicta the force of law by incorporating
them into statutes. A few recent writers have begun to chain-
pion the doctrine. Under such circumstances, is benefit to the
promisor consideration, or is it not consideration, in Anglo-
American law? Again, it is submitted, that no one knows.
Detriment to Promisee (or Person Furnishing Consideration)
Has detriment to the promisee in any form been adopted,
since the sixteenth century, as sufficient consideration for a
promise? Yes. Other things may be sufficient consideration.
Consideration may not always have to be legal detriment. But,
if it is given as the price for a promise, legal detriment in some
sense is always consideration. This theory of consideration had
its origin in the action of special assumpsit. When this action
was regarded as a tort action, the courts allowed recovery where
the defendant undertook to do something for the plaintiff and
58 Langdell, Contracts, See. 64; Pollock, Contracts (3d ed.), pp. 9, 185,
189; Harriman, Contracts, Sec. 91; Elliott, Contracts, Sec. 203; II Street,
Found. of Leg. Lia, pp. 67-69, 110. "The principle, however, must be con-
sidered established that the element which alone gives efficacy to the as-
sumptual promise is detriment to the promisee." II Street, Found. of Leg.
Lia., 68.
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF CONTRACTS
was guilty of malfeasance, or misfeasance, 59 or nonfeasance, 0
to the plaintiff's detriment, or injury. After recovery was
allowed in the case of nonfeasance, the action came to be re-
garded as a contract action. Then the courts found considera-
tion in the detriment of the old cases, but, for reasons to be
referred to later, they began to require that this detriment be
incurred as the price, or inducement, etc., for the promise, instead
of its merely following the breach of the promise. There is no
doubt, therefore, that ever since the courts took this position
detriment to the promisee has been regarded as sufficient con-
sideration for a promise, if given in exchange for it, and there
are thousands of cases in the books which have so held. The
only doubt is as to the meaning of the expression "detriment to
the promisee." What is meant by this term? Does it mean any
act or promise to which a person has a legal capacity, that is,
any legal right, power, privilege, or immunity? Or does it
mean simply any act or promise, irrespective of the question as
to whether or not a person has a legal capacity with reference
thereto? There seems to be authority for each of these views,
at least, and we shall consider them separately.61 The term
clearly does not mean actual detriment.
Any Act or Promise With Reference to Which a Person Has
Legal Capacity-Legal Right, Power, Privilege, or Immunity
Will the surrender for a promise (in a unilateral agreement),
or the promise to surrender for a promise (in a bilateral agree-
ment), of anything with reference to which a person has a legal
right, a legal power, a legal privilege, or a legal immunity
amount to sufficient consideration? Yes. There is no doubt that
this will be sufficient consideration (with perhaps one exception
to be discussed later.) There seem to be no cases holding
59 Watson v. Brinth, Year Book, 2 Hen. IV 3 b; Y. B., 11 Hen. IV 33 a;
Y. B., 3 Hen. VI 36 b.
6) Anonymous Case, Y. B. 21 Hen. VII 41, also reported in Keilway,
78 pl. 5; Estrigge v. Owles, 3 Leon. 200; Banes' Case, 9 Coke 94. In Y. B.
21 Edw. IV 23, pl. 6, and Y. B. 20 Hen. VII 8, pl. 18, the reason given for
such extension of the action of special assumpsit was to obviate the neces-
sity of suitors going into chancery. See also, Hare, Contracts, Ch. VII;
Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 129, 323; Holmes, The Common Law,
289, 290.
01 Some authorities assert that detriment to the promisee can be found
only in the obligation in law created by a promise. Pollock, Contracts (3d
Am. ed.), 202; Langdell, Contracts, Sec. 81.
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otherwise. Instead, most of the cases hold that unless a person
surrenders, or promises to surrender, one of the above things,
there is no consideration.6 2 This is the doctrine of legal detri-
ment. According to this doctrine it is not necessary for the
promisee to sustain or to promise to sustain actual detriment. If
he gives up, or promises to give up, any legal right, legal power,
legal privilege, or legal immunity, it is sufficient.
Any legal right, or the promise thereof, given for a promise,
has universally been held sufficient consideration. Thus the
surrender of possession of chattels in bailment cases,63 the
giving up of a paper containing a guaranty even though the
guaranty was unenforceable,64 a promise to pay a part of
the ground rent to a third person and a promise to make
repairs,6 5 the delivery of a check,66 a promise to share profits, 67
a promise to pay chattels, 68 the turning over to another of
certain bills receivable, 69 a promise to pay interest,70 have all
been held to be sufficient consideration, because in each case
62 Warren v. Hodge, 121 Mass. 106; Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605;
Austin, etc., Co. v. Bahn, 87 Tex. 582; Poole v. Boston, 5 Cush. 219; Keith
v. Miles, 39 Miss. 442; Fink v. Smith, 170 Pa. 124; Neikirk v. Williams,
81 W. Va. 558; Strong v. Sheffield, 144 N. Y. 392; Stilk v. Myrick, 2
Camp. 317; Davis & Co. v. Morgan, 117 Ga. 504; Vanderbilt P. Schreyer,
91 N. Y. 392; McDevitt v. Stokes, 174 Ky. 515; Bridge v. Cage, Cro. Jac.
103; Gray v. Martino, 91 N. J. L. 462; Ryan v. Dockery, 134 Wis. 431;
Tolhurst et al. v. Powers, 133 N. Y. 460; Herring v. Dorell, 8 Dowling 604
(Eng.); Springstead v. Ness et al., 125 App. Div. (N. Y.) 230; White v.
Bluett, 23 L. J. (N. S.) Exch. 36; Ford v. Gorner, 15 Ind. 298.
It would seem as though the court might have found legal detriment in
the case of Springstead v. Nees, supra, in the fact that the other children
had the legal privilege of complaining. In the case of White v. Bluett,
supra, perhaps the father had the legal right to have his son refrain from
complaining. Otherwise this case is like Springstead v. Nees, and both
would confine legal detriment to cases of strict legal rights.
63 Bainbridge v. Firmstone, 8 Adol. & El. 743. It should be noted that
in gratuitous bailments there is no consideration because, though there is
legal detriment, it is not the price of the promise. 5 Harv. L. Rev. 222.
64 Haigh v. Brooks, 10 Adol. & El. 309.
65 Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Q. B. 851. Probably this case was wrongly
decided because the legal detriment was not the price of the promise.
66 Bidder v. Bridges, 37 Ch. D. 406. Cf. United States cases.
67 Coleman v. Eyre, 45 N. Y. 38.
68 Lima, etc., Co. v. National, etc., Co., 155 Fed. 77; Koehler, etc., Co. v.
Illinois Glass Co., 143 Minn. 344.
69 Murphy v. Hanna, et al., 37 N. D. 156.
70 McComb v. Kittridge, 14 Ohio 348.
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there has been the giving up, or the promise to give up, some-
thing to which a person has a legal right. Many other illustra-
tions of consideration of this sort could be given. The giving up,
or the promise to give up, a legal right to a tract of land, or any
interest therein, a legal right to a contract or any other incorpo-
real thing, a legal right to any corporeal chattel, a legal right to
safety, a legal right to reputation, a legal right to liberty, or
any other legal right, so long as the law will permit it, would
amount to legal detriment and therefore sufficient considera-
tion.71
In the same way any legal privilege, or the promise thereof,
given for a promise, has been held to be sufficient consideration.
An inferred promise to buy coal of one person rather than an-
other,72 making an affidavit, 73 taking a trip to Europe,7 4 a prom-
ise to defend suits, 7 5 an act by an officer outside his legal duty,76
refraining from drinking liquor or from using tobacco,77 re-
fraining from other bad habits, 78 getting an acceptable tenant,79
refraining from trying to get a husband to change the benefi-
ciary in an insurance policy,80 an inferred promise to use reason-
able efforts to bring profits,8 ' a promise to give another a right
to buy back stock,8 2 giving an executor the privilege of suing
in his own name,8 3 giving up the privilege of going through
71 13 C. J. 308-320; Givan v. Swadley, 3 Ind. 484 (balance of judgment);
Butler v. Edgerton, 15 Ind. 15 (possession of bonds); Starkey 'v. Nees, 30
Ind. 222 (money); Henry v. Ritenour, 31 Ind. 136 (debt due from third);
Menifee v. Clark, 35 Ind. 304 (money); Kanarr v. The Sand Creek Turn-
pike Co., 45 Ind. 278 (lien); Lee v. Carter, 52 Ind. 342 (services); Watson
v. Deeds, 3 Ind. App. 75 (invention); Penn. Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App. 109
(damages); Farr v. Bach, 13 Ind. App. 125 (judgment); Rollins v. Hare,
15 Ind. App. 677 (lien); Storms v. Storms, 21 Ind. App. 191 (equity of
redemption); Dailey v. Dailey, 26 Ind. App. 14 (inchoate interest in land);
Robinson v. Foust, 31 Ind. App. 384 (separate estate).
72 Wells v. Alexander, 130 N. Y. 642.
73 Brooks v. Ball, 18 John. 337.
74 Deveemon v. Shaw, 69 Md. 199.
75 Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114.
76 England v. Davidson, 11 Adol. & El. 856; Hartley v. Inhabitants, etc.,
216 Mass. 38.
77 Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538.
78 Dunton v. Dunton, 18 Vic. L. Rep. 114.
79 Underwood, etc., Co. v. Century R. Co., 220 Mo. 522.
80 Orr v. Orr, 181 Ill. App. 148.
81 Wood v. Lucy, etc., 222 N. Y. 88.
82 Vickery et al. v. Maier et al., 164 Cal. 384.
83 Goring v. Goring, Yelv. 11.
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bankruptcy, 84 marriage,8 5 forbearance from suing, or a promise
to forbear from suing, on a doubtful claim honestly asserted on
reasonable grounds,8 6 and many other things too numerous to
mention have been held sufficient consideration if given for a
promise, though they were only legal privileges.
The giving, or the promise to give, for a promise, any legal
power, or any legal immunity causing detriment to the promisee
will also amount to consideration. A good illustration of how
the surrender of a power, or the promise to do so, may amount
to legal detriment is found in the case of White v. McMath &
84 Melroy et al. v. Kemmerer, 218 Pa. 381.
85 13 C. J. 322; Ransdel v. Moore, 153 Ind. 393.
86 Rivett and Rivett's Case, 1 Leon. 118; Smith v. Monteith, 13 M. &
W. 427; Cook v. Wright, 1 Best & Smith 559; Callisher v. Bischoffsheim,
L. R. 5, Q. B. 449; Miles v. New Zealand, 32 Ch. Div. 266; Hay v. Fortier,
116 Me. 455; Morton v. Bum & Vaux, 7 Adol. & El. 19. At first the Eng-
lish cases held that forbearance to sue, or a promise to forbear from
suing, would amount to consideration only when one had a legal right to
sue. Bidwell v. Catton, Hobart 216; Mapes v. Sidney, Cro. Jac. 683;
Davies v. Warner, Cro. Jac. 593; Lloyd v. Lloyd, 1 Strange 94; Atkinson v.
Settree, Willes 482; Jones v. Ashburnham, 4 East 455. Then it was held
that if suit had actually been instituted, forbearance to prosecute it would
be sufficient consideration, whether or not such suit would have been suc-
cessful. Longridge v. Dorville, 5 B. & Ald. 117; Rivett v. Rivett's Case, 1
Leon. 118; Dowdenay v. Oland, Cro. Eliz. 768. But finally the English
court took the position that forbearance or a promise to forbear suit upon
a doubtful claim, if reasonably and honestly asserted, is sufficient considera-
tion whether or not suit has previously been begun. Wade v. Simeon, 2
C. B. 548; Cook v. Wright, 1 Best & Smith 559; Miles v. New Zealand, 32
Ch. Div. 266.
The present English position seems to the writer to be correct, because
under such circumstances a plaintiff has the privilege to sue. If a legal
wrong has been committed,, a person has a legal right to sue, because of
his remedial right in personam. Even though no legal wrong has been
committed, a person has a privilege to sue so long as the claim is reason-
able and honestly asserted, because the other party has no right to have
him refrain from suing. Everyone has a right not to be sued maliciously
and without probable cause, and there is the correlative duty not to insti-
tute such action. A violation of this duty is the tort of malicious prosecu-
tion. Where there would be no tort in suing, a person has the privilege
of suing. The English law of contracts is, therefore, right, but its law of
torts should be extended to cover civil actions where the privilege of suit
is denied. Generally it will not be known ahead of time whether a person
has the right or only the privilege of suing. If he wins his suit, that
determines that he had a legal right to sue. If he loses his suit, still he
had the legal privilege of suing except where he would have been guilty
of malicious prosecution by suing.
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Johnson.s7 In that case McMath & Johnson had received from
the owners an offer of sale of a tract of land, which gave them
the power of making a contract by acceptance. White also de-
sired to purchase this property, but the owners would not make
him an offer so long as their offer to McMath and Johnson stood.
White then offered to pay them $240 for their promise to re-
linquish their power of acceptance and they accepted his offer
and made such promise. The court held this sufficient considera-
tion for White's promise. An illustration of an immunity whose
surrender would amount to legal detriment is found in the con-
stitutional immunity given against the impairment of the
obligation of a contract.
(To be Concluded)
In the United States there is a conflict in the decisions upon this sub-
ject. So far as consideration is concerned some cases follow the recent
English doctrine, while others follow the early or middle English rule.
Indiana seems to have authority for all these rules. Harris v. Cassady,
107 Ind. 158; Moon v. Martin, 122 Ind. 211; U. S. Mtg. Co. v. Henderson
et al., 111 Ind. 24. So far as malicious prosecution is concerned, a major-
ity of the United States cases have extended the law to meet the modern
English rule as to consideration. Prout v. Inhabitants, etc., 154 Mass. 450;
Blount v. Wheeler et al., 199 Mass. 330; 26 Cyc. 12-16; 13 C. J. 346-7;
MeCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538.
87 127 Tenn. 713.
Is there always a power in one person to break a contract? Yes, so
far as creating a secondary obligation. No, so far as discharging the
primary obligation, without the consent of the other party. The immunity
of the other party from breach is also protected by the remedies of specific
performance, replevin, and execution. Is the power to create a secondary
obligation sufficient consideration for a promise? No. Not between the
same parties, either because it is against social interest to permit one
to contract to refrain from illegality or because not the right sort of detri-
ment to the promisee.
